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Introduction
In everyday live, individuals routinely take choices affecting their health status and mortality risks. Examples include nutrition habits, travelling decisions, leisure activities or working choices. In such situations, people and societies implicitly value their life in the sense that they trade off risks against wealth or income. There are several approaches to evaluate these trade offs and, therefore, human life monetarily. Perhaps the most accepted ones are the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) and the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) (see, e.g., Jones-Lee 1974 , Viscusi 1993 , 2008 , Johansson 1995 , Johannesson, Johansson and O'Connor 1996 , Hammitt 2002 , Viscusi and Aldy 2003 , Sunstein 2004 ).
The VSL relies on the willingness to pay (or the willingness to accept) for changes in mortality risks and is usually based on questionnaires or market observations to calculate these values. QALYs refer to a change in life quality and are defined as the value of living one year in a certain health condition (see, e.g., Drummond et al. 2005 , Weinstein 2005 ). They represent use values that can be monetised either via willingness to pay approaches or via information on health expenditures of the respective medical intervention. While the VSL evalutes the human life as a whole without considering any time dimension, QALYs are applied to evaluate a change in life quality due to a medical treatment, for example, and they explicitly take reference to a specific time period (typically a year). This paper presents an alternative method for evaluating human life based on damages for pain and suffering (DPS). DPS represent monetary payments assigned by courts to compensate an individual for a physical and mental distress that is caused by the wrongdoing of other persons. Therefore, they do not rely on risk perceptions of interviewed persons, but rather on (ideally) consistent decisions of courts and their instances. Using DPS from about 1,100 judgments from Germany and Austria over 25 years, we illustrate how monetary values of single body parts and body functions can be aggregated to a value of a whole human body, which we refer to as the "Value of Damages for Pain and Suffering" (VDPS) . For our sample of German and Austrian verdicts, we calculate a VDPS of about EUR 1.79 millions (with a range between EUR 0.67 and EUR 4.62 millions). These values are generally in accordance with the ones from previous VSL studies in these countries. In contrast to these studies, the VDPS also provides a disaggregated measure that allows to determine the value of (anatomical) body parts and body functions, which might be of interest in situations, where information on the benefits of public programs to improve an individual's life quality is not entirely known, e.g., the authorization of innovative medical treatments and/or surgical procedures. This, in turn, links the VDPS to the QALY approach.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the legal framework of tort law, especially of damages for pain and suffering; we further provide a law and economics interpretation of the VDPS and compare the underlying conceptual framework with the VSL and the QALY approach. Section 3 describes and presents our sample of German and Austrian DPS. Section 4 demonstrates how monetary values for human body parts and body functions can be inferred from these data. Afterwards, we use these values to calculate the value of a fully operating human body, the VDPS. Section 5 discusses the practical relevance of our approach to evaluate human life, and Section 6 concludes.
Background
Generally, damages are defined as the amount of money that is awarded to compensate someone who has been harmed by another's wrongdoing or negligence. Thereby, harm constitutes the first element required for damages action, the others being cause and breach of duty (see Cooter and Ulen 2008 , for a discussion). Generally, damages include pain and suffering, healing costs, present and future loss of earning capacity, as well as payments for psychological and social damage. DPS only focus on the compensation of physical and mental distress suffered from an injury, including fractured body parts and internal ruptures as well as the pain, the temporary and permanent limitations on activity, the potential shortening of life and other forms of suffering (see Posner 2007) . They do not cover a decrease in the marginal utility of income due to the injury and a loss of income associated with, for example, sickness absences, reductions in working hours or forces to accept lower paid jobs. 4 DPS are awarded by courts and affected by a country's tort law, 1 and, in addition, by the severity and intensity of the injury, the impairment of life quality and the duration of pain. Therefore, the monetary value for DPS is subjective in two regards. First, it depends on the individual injury and the aggrieved party's change of life quality, and, second, on the court's assessment of the direct harm (change of life quality) that was inflicted upon the victim. In economic terms, the underlying harm (pain and suffering) is directly transformed into a loss of utility that is evaluated ex post by a third party, the courts.
Consequently, DPS should mirror a monetary value providing enough utility to bring the plaintiff back to the original utility level. What is compensated for is exclusively the change in utility due to physical and mental distress, but not the indirect influence of health on earning capacity and income. In this sense, DPS can be viewed as a monetary value for body parts and body functions. This interpretation is illustrated in Figure 1 , capturing an individual that derives utility from health, H, and wealth, W, so that the utility function is U(H,W). The corresponding indifference curves in Figure 1 highlight the basic trade off between health and wealth. Figure 1 : DPS due to changes in the utility after an injury 1 In Section 3.1., we discuss the details of the German and Austrian tort law.
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Consider an individual with health status H 0 and initial wealth W 0 . In case of pain and suffering, health quality drops down to H 1 at the indifference curve U 1 . If initial wealth is unaffected by the damage, as assumed in Figure 1 , the individual is left at W 0 . A perfect compensation for this suffering -the monetary value of DPS -enables the victim to return to the initial utility level U 0 . In Figure 1 , this is equal to the payment of W * -W 0 .
Thereby, we assume that the damage in health is irreparable, so that the individual is stuck in H 1 . Hence, DPS represent the monetary equivalent of an individuals's irreparable decline in health (see Cooter and Ulen 2008) . Further, it is obvious from Figure 1 that the monetary compensation on DPS, W * -W 0 , depends on (i) the initial health status (i.e., the lower the health status, the higher is the monetary value of DPS; DPS converge to infinity if health quality is very low), (ii) the severity and intensity of the damage (i.e., the closer U 0 and U 1 are, the lower is the monetary value of DPS), and (iii) the shape of the indifference curves, i.e., the more curvilinear the indifference curves are, the higher are the DPS. 2 Figure 1 depicts a situation where an individual is only faced with a decrease in health, but not with a change in wealth. In reality, injuries might also reduce an individual's wealth due to, for example, pecuniar damages or changes in earning capacity. In this case, the individual would be awarded by an additional payment capturing the reduction in wealth (e.g., losses in income due to sickness absence). But such payments would be a result of a change in wealth and not a change in health quality, and, therefore, they cannot be interpreted as a monetary value of the direct loss of utility due to a reduced health status. Consequently, one has to rely only on DPS when calculating a moentary value of body parts and body functions.
Judges ideally base their assessments on an appraisal of the victim's utility from health and wealth and calculate ex post the payment that compensates for the corresponding change in utility. Their decisions are closely tied to a country's legal framework. It is encouraging to compare this approach with the previous ones discussed 6 in literature. In this regard, the VSL and the QALY are probably the most accepted and widest used approaches to measure individual changes in health and life quality.
The VSL starts with valuating a marginal change in the individuals' mortality risk, relying on personal judgments, either gained from observed market decisions (e.g., in the labour market) or from questionnaires on valuations of hypothetical risk changes. Then, the amount assigned to the marginal risk change is aggregated to obtain the value of a statistical life. In particular, the VSL is calculated as the ratio between the willingness to pay (WTP) for or the willingsness to accept (WTA) a marginal change in mortality risks and the underlying risk variation. In this regard, the VSL represents a trade off between wealth or income and a certain risk variation (see, e.g., Jones-Lee 1974 or Viscusi 1992) .
QALYs are commonly applied to evaluate impairments or improvements in the state of health due to a medical treatment (i.e., a therapy or a surgery). Similar to the VSL, a QALY refers to the direct health effects on the individuals' utility, i.e., a change in utility due to an improvement or decline in health quality. Either potential beneficiaries or experts (physicians) determine the change in health, i.e., the movement from H 1 to H 0 in Both, VSL and many QALY studies rely on the WTA or WTP to monetize life (quality). The WTA answers the question on how much an individual has to be paid ex ante to accept a lower health status (say, H 1 in Figure 1 ), but maintaining the initial utility 7 level (U 0 in Figure 1 ). In Figure 1 , this loss in health quality, H 0 -H 1 , is compensated by the amount of W * -W 0 . The WTP, in contrast, reflects the amount an individual is willing to pay ex ante to increase her health status (e.g., a movement from H 1 to H 0 in Figure 1 ).
Assuming an initial consumption of W * and the corresponding life quality H 1 (i.e., utility level U 0 ), an individual is willing to pay W * -W 0 to end up at an improved health status of H 0 and, thus, to keep the utility at U 0 . In any case, both the WTA and the WTP capture the financial payment that compensates an individual for a change in health quality. From this, we firmly can conclude that DPS and the subjective judgments on WTA or WTP turn out to be very similar from a conceptual perspective. The differences between these concepts are In the next section, we present a dataset from Germany and Austria that allows to derive DPS, which can be aggregated to a monetary value of body parts and body functions and, subsequently, to a monetary value for a whole human body.
Application: A dataset of German and Austrian verdicts on damages for pain and suffering

Legal charcteristics of the German and Austrian DPS verdicts
In Germany and Austria, DPS are awarded for physical and mental distress suffered from an injury and aim at compensating the experienced and future pain and the overall resulting loss of life quality. Thereby, the German and Austrian Civil Code only provide a 8 vague framework, which passes the effective evaluation task on to the jurisdiction. 4 Hence, it rests on the civil courts (i.e., the judges) to decide on the magnitude of the compensation. 5 The legal system as well as the legal practice support this judiciary decision making by different means. First, judges are guided by the basic functions of German and Austrian tort law, namely the compensation and the satisfaction function.
While the former refers to the idea that the aggrieved party should be appropriately compensated for the damage, the latter intends to pander the experienced harm (see, e.g., Schäfer and Ott 2000). Second, courts are supported by the qualitative evaluation of the (changed) health status of expert opinions (mainly physicians) that comprise the severity of the injury, the impairment of life quality, the intensity of suffering due to the damage (including psychological burden) and the duration of pain. Third, judges typically refer to precedents and specific pain and suffering guidelines extracted from German and Austrian jurisdictions. For example, judges' evaluation of DPS should not distinguish between males and females since courts should follow a gender neutral line in reasoning.
Further, age as such should not determine the compensations as young and old people alike suffer from pain. One exception might be permanent damages since young people are confronted with a longer period of poorer health than older persons. Finally, courts should consider contributory negligency when awarding the payment.
Data description
We extract information on DPS for Germany and Austria from the verdict collections Böhm (2006, 2007) and Danzl, Gutierr-Lobos and Müller (2007) .
According to the specific interpretation of DPS provided in our theoretical section reflecting the German and Austrian tort law, this data set exclusively covers DPS and not other related compensations (e.g., changes in earning capacity). Originally, our sample includes around 5,000 verdicts on DPS between 1980 and 2004 (2,871 for Germany and 2,022 for Austria). It contains individual information on the victim's gender and age, on the type and number of injuries and the amount of compensation. In addition, it includes information on the court type (see footnote 5) and the instance where the decision took place (i.e., first, second or third instance), on comparative negligence and details of the injury (e.g., bruises, fractions, amputations). In cases where persons suffer from more than one injury, we are not able to assign the corresponding judgement to one single injury. To avoid potentially biases in aggregating the corresponding DPS, we exclude these observations from the sample. This reduces our dataset to 1,608 observations, i.e., 1,262 (79 percent) from Germany and 346 (21 percent) from Austria.
Each entry in the database represents a value for main anatomical parts and functions of the body. We use this information to define subcategories (i.e., components of body parts and body functions) and sum up these values to obtain a value for a fully operative human body. As mentioned above, we refer to this value as the VDPS. (299, 507) . Approximately 47 percent of the victims in the dataset are females (in 137 cases we do not have information on the plaintiff's gender). The average age of the victims is around 33 years. For most of the judgments in the sample, however, age is only classified into "child" (victims between zero and 14 years; coded with entry "1" in the subsequent analysis), "young" (between 15 and 18 years; coded with "2"), "adult" (between 19 and 65 years; coded with "3") and "retired" (older than 65; coded with "4"). Therefore, we only have 565 observations (judgments) where we know exactly the age of the victim. 29 percent of the plaintiffs are at least partly contributory negligent, and 27 percent suffered a permanent damage (in 11 cases, we do not have information on this variable). Regarding instances, 49 (43) percent can be assigned to the first (second) instance, while a considerably lower share (around 8 percent) was decided in the third instance. Next, we apply a simple regression analysis to examine whether our data is in accordance with the above mentioned German and Austrian legal framework. Such an analysis is further useful to obtain some insights on whether and by how much DPS are systematically affected by the victims' personal characteristics, by the circumstances of the damage and by other aspects of the proceeding itself. Specifically, we regress DPS on a set of explanatory variables including the victim's gender, information on contributory negligence and on permanent damages, on the instance where the decision was made and a set of dummy variables for the injuries (i.e., the aforementioned subcategories). In our case, compensations on DPS are log-normally distributed, so that we take the logarithm of DPS as the dependent variable.
Descriptive statistics and data features
Since the age variable is not fully available in our sample, we estimate two versions of the regression. One where we completely leave out the age information, obtaining a sample of 1,459 observations. In a second specification, we further include indicator variables of the above mentioned age cohorts (the cohort of children is the reference category left out in the regressions), leaving with a much lower sample size of 885 observations. To capture the fact that age should only play a role in the context of permanent damages, we also incorporate interaction terms between the age cohorts and permanent injuries. Finally, to control for a potential difference in DPS between Germany and Austria we include a country dummy (taking entry 1 for Austria), and a time trend to allow for a yearwise change in compensations. With regard to the victims' personal characteristics we do not find a significant difference in compensations between males and females and between younger and elder age cohorts. This is not really surprising as courts should follow a gender-neutral reasoning in their decisions. Similarly, age should not determine the compensations as young and old people alike suffer from pain. Further, we would expect to find higher payments for permanent damages in younger than in older age cohorts since younger people are confronted with longer time periods in poorer health than older ones.
Regarding this, we firstly find a significantly positive and considerably large effect of permanent damages in the youngest age cohort (which is the reference group in the left panel of Table 2 ), implying up to three times the DPS than for that of a non-permanent damage in that age group. Second, we find insignifcant coefficients for the interaction terms of permanent damages and the other age cohorts, implying that there is no difference in compensations for permanent damages between younger and older age cohorts. However, one reason for this result might be that the interaction terms and the permanent damage variable are closely correlated (for instance, the correlation coefficient between permanent damages and the interaction term of permanent damages with the middle age cohort is around 0.74, implying potentially ineffecient parameter estimates).
For victims with contributory negligence, we would predict reduced monetary compensation, which is confirmed by the parameter estimates of Table 2 (the difference is around 40 percent). Finally, we observe a systematic difference between the first and the second (third) instance of around 60 percent (44 or 100 percent, depending on which sample we are focusing on).
Overall, our findings of the regression analysis suggest that our dataset of German and Austrian verdicts on pain and suffering are generally well in accordance with the expectations that we would derive from the design of the legal systems in these countries.
Further, a comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 reveals that our estimation results are not seriously driven by outlying observations (judgments). This, together with the fact that the point estimates in both samples with and without age information are very similar, suggests that we can rely on the full sample of all 1,608 observations when calculating the VDPS.
Calculating the value for damages on pain and suffering
To calculate the VDPS we firstly follow the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) of the World Health Organization (WHO) and assign each of our 1,608 judgments into one out of 25 main and 123 subcategories. 6 The main categories comprise body structures as anatomical parts of the body such as face, arms, legs and internal organs. The subcategories provide information on body functions and impairments, i.e., fractures, bruises and amputations. Disease patterns, such as headache or blood pressure, are excluded from the sample. In the next step, we derive a monetary value for each of the main category and subcategory in the sample, which, in a final step, can be aggregated to a fully operating human body. Out of the 123 above mentioned subcategories we rely on 83 ones to compute the VDPS. This choice was taken according to the opinion of medical experts that guided our study. 7 A full list of all 83 subcategories used in the subsequent calculations is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix.
Let us refer to the example of human legs to illustrate how we calcualte a monetary value of main body parts (see Table 3 ). To determine the monetary value of legs we sum up the DPS with regard to all body components and dysfunctions of the thighs, the knees, the lower legs and the feet. As can be seen from Table 3 , overall we use 20 subcategories and calculate an (unweighted) average value of about EUR 549,000 for two human legs.
The corresponding minimum is about EUR 310,000, and the maximum lies around EUR 1,056,000, and the interquartile range is between EUR 390,000 and EUR 654,000. In a similar vein, we derive values for each of the main (anatomical) body parts including the necessary body functions (e.g., senses or the nervous system) and the psyche. Our results are summarized in Table 4 , where the number of subcategories is reported in column 2 and the number of judgments (observations) is indicated in column 3. For instance, we compute an aggregate average value of arms of about EUR 185,300, which is based on seven subcategories with 137 judgments on DPS. Table 4 reveals that the sum of all main body parts is around EUR 1.79 millions. The minimum (maximum) value is about EUR 669,000 (4.62 millions), the 1st and 3rd quartile lie at 993,000 EUR and 2,261,000 EUR. These values can be interpreted as the value of a fully operative human body, the VDPS, which is based on DPS verdicts from Germany and Austria. 
Discussion
In Section 2, we have shown that both concepts, the VSL and the VDPS, rely on the same conceptual background. From this, one might ask whether our value for the VDPS is consistent with the ones derived in VSL studies. For instance, Spengler and Schaffner (2007) , using German labor market data, estimate a VSL lying within a range of EUR 1.91 millions and EUR 6.20 millions (in 2005 Euros). For Austria, the values of VSL studies are broadly within this range. Weiss, Maier and Gerking (1986) , focusing on labor market data, find a VSL between EUR 4.41 millions and EUR 7.35 millions (in 2005 Euros) . Similarly, according to Maier, Gerking and Weiss (1989) and to Leiter and Pruckner (2007) , both applying a contingent valuation approach (i.e., a questionnaire) to derive a VSL for Austria, the VSL is between EUR 2 millions and EUR 5 millions (in 2005 Euros). Although our results for the VDPS are at the lower bound of these figures, they are generally consistent with these studies. This, in turn, suggests that the VDPS is a serious alternative for valuating human life. However, one particular advantage of the VDPS is that it provides additional information on the value of single human body parts, which might be of interest in the context of QALYs.
Similar to the QALY, the VDPS provides disaggregated information about life quality. Further, as is obvious from our discussion in Section 2, both concepts are identical from a conceptual perspective. However, while the VDPS explicitly provides a monetary measure, the QALY represents a use value that has to be transformed into Roels et al. (2003) , who calculate the monetary value of a QALY for a kidney from a European sample, provides a pretty nice example: They estimate a monetary value of a QALY referring to a kidney transplantation of about EUR 26,000. 8 In our case, we observe an average compensation of EUR 29,250 for the same organ (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Hence, the VDPS developed in this paper provides monetary values of single body parts and body functions without making it necessary to transform personal beliefs or observed market behavior into monetary values.
Admittedly, the calculation of the VDPS is based on somewhat critical assumptions.
First, we assume that the judges perfectly account for the decrease in the victims' utility.
The VDPS might be biased if the courts do not consider or are not aware of all personal circumstances driving the individual's trade off between health and wealth. Second, to calculate the VDPS we rely on an aggregation rule that is based on unweighted figures. This induces a further source of potential biases, depending on whether the value of the whole body is assumed to be higher or lower than the sum over all single body parts and body functions. Third, our data set of German and Austrian verdicts exhibits a relatively thin representation in some subcategories (e.g., for the hip we only have seven victims; see Table 4 ). Clearly, the VDPS and the corresponding DPS of body parts and body functions become more reliable with increased sample size.
On the other hand, the VDPS is easy to obtain if verdicts on pain and suffering are collected in a systematic and comprehensive way. In addition, it does not need any risk perceptions of individuals or information on their market behavior to calculate monetary values of changes in health quality. After all, we would argue that the VDPS is an interesting and potentially useful alternative to VSL and (monetised) QALY studies, at least to provide some sensitivity checks in evaluating health improvements due to innovative medical treatments and techniques. Using data from about 1,100 German and Austrian court decisions on damages for pain and suffering over the years 1980 to 2004 we calculate an average VDPS of around EUR 1.79 millions (the minimum is EUR 0.67 millions, and the maximum is EUR 4.62 millions), which is within the range of the estimates reported in comparable VSL studies from Germany and Austria. However, the major difference between the VDPS and previous VSL studies to evaluate human life is that it does not only provide information on the value of a whole human life or life quality, but also on the (monetary) value of body parts and body functions, which, in turn, might be important if information on the benefits of changes in life quality due to marginal improvements in health and medical technology is scarce or not entirely known.
Conclusions
Finally, we demonstrate that the VDPS might be also interesting in the context of QALYs, which need personal judgments or market observations to provide monetary values of improvements in health quality. The VDPS is based on the same conceptual background, but directly provides monetary values of changes in health status. This, in turn, allows to monetize QALYs ex post without having ex ante information on how improvements in health quality are perceived by the individuals.
